This is my first issue of Discourse and the end of my first year as Chair, and it is a great pleasure to speak to you briefly about the contents of this newsletter and about life in the Department of Political Science. I want to thank Joe Fletcher and Hyla Levy for the fine work they have put into the preparation of Discourse in recent years, and to salute the new team who are taking over. Michael Stein, who has joined us from McMaster, and Elinor Bray-Collins, one of our talented doctoral students, have assumed responsibility for its preparation and production. Michael is now teaching for us and for the new School of Public Policy and Governance; Elinor is doing her dissertation on the communal politics of Lebanon.

It’s been a very good year. The Department has been buzzing with conferences, and workshops, and teaching and research activities, much of the activity involving our students. The tempo has been set in no small part by the growing and quite wonderful cohort of younger faculty who have joined the Department in recent years. There are examples of this in the pages that follow – stories with an international development and security focus: Emanuel Adler reports on an imaginative workshop and set of public lectures on rationality and the Middle East conflict; Elizabeth King, a doctoral student, and Professor Emeritus Bob Matthews write about a February workshop they organized, involving both faculty and graduate students, on peace building in Iraq, Lebanon, Somalia and Sudan; Mike Lawrence, an undergraduate student, gives an account of a conference he helped to organize on conflict prevention in global politics, which brought together over a 100 delegates from around the world; Antoinette Handley, one of our younger faculty, speaks of the macropolitics of HIV/AIDS; and Melissa Levin, who is doing a doctorate in comparative politics and political theory, reflects on public holidays, memory and nation-building in South Africa.

We have hired four terrific new faculty members. Wendy Wong will be joining us in July 2008. She is completing her degree in international relations at the University of California, San Diego. Lynette Ong, from the Australian National University, has accepted a joint position in Asian Political Economy and Public Policy. At UTSC, we have recruited Margaret Kohn, a political theorist who has been teaching at the University of Florida. Christian Breunig, a public policy specialist at the University of Washington, will be joining us in July 2008, after a post-doc at the Max Planck Institute in Cologne.

We have secured money from the Student Experience Fund to renovate the central core of our third floor at Sidney Smith, so that our undergraduate students will have space in the Department for the first time, and so that our graduate students will have more and better space. This is long overdue and I hope that it will prove to be the first step in an ongoing effort to spruce up our – shall we say? – utilitarian third floor. And we have some interesting tri-campus teaching initiatives bubbling, which I will report on in a future issue of Discourse.

But all of this is just touching the surface of the Department’s life. Read on, and enjoy a glimpse of what some of our faculty and students have been up to in recent months.

David Cameron
On February 16, 2007 a workshop on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and rationality was held at the Munk Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto. The workshop addressed the question of whether the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has a rational solution. The workshop’s main idea is to combine experts on rationality and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to jointly think creatively and “outside the box” about not only whether the Arab-Israeli conflict has a rational solution, but also about “what is rationality in order that the conflict may end by rational means”.

Workshop participants included Professor Michael Barnett, University of Minnesota, Professor Jon Elster, College de France, Professor Daniel Kahneman (Nobel Prize, 2002), Princeton University, Professor Avishai Margalit, Princeton University, Professor Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Hebrew University, Professor Joel Migdal, University of Washington, Professor Sari Nusseibeh, President, Al-Quds University, Professor Yezid Sayigh, Kings College, Professor Thomas Schelling (Nobel Prize, 2005), University of Maryland, Professor Janice Stein, University of Toronto, and Professor Emanuel Adler, University of Toronto. Parallel to, and in symbiotic relationships with, the workshop, three public lectures were also held where Professors Jon Elster, Daniel Kahneman, and Thomas Schelling each discussed advances in the meaning of rationality in three separate but thematically related talks.

What follows here is, first, the agenda for discussion which proposes ten problems of, and five solutions for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and second, a brief synthesis of the workshop, where its main ideas, contributions, and the resulting questions are summarized. Both pieces are by Emanuel Adler and are based on the questions and thoughts of the conference participants.

Is There a Rational Solution to the Arab-Israeli Conflict? An Agenda for Discussion.

This workshop has been convened in the belief that, although it may seldom happen, sometimes academic knowledge may help mitigate human conflict. Can our best and latest understanding of rationality, practical reason, and psychological and sociological processes affecting decision-making help us say something new and important about solving the Arab-Israeli conflict now? We obviously are not searching for a “technical fix” to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and we do not agree about everything: While some say that a rational solution to the conflict exists and is well known, what is problematic is the rationality of the “process”. Others say that there is no rational solution and that this is not a problem. The suggestion here is that these and other issues about rationality and non-rationality should be discussed less in the abstract and more by focusing first on the problems that impede the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and second, on the nature of the solutions.

The Problems:
1. The lack of common knowledge about the nature of the game, and the lack of common values. This problem is compounded by subject rigidity stemming from fixed identities. Identity takes us to the heart of the conflict. This raises two questions, first, can deep identity conflicts be rationalized in a Weberian sense, and second, how can you change yourself in order to change the other, without destroying yourself and your identity in the process?
2. Too much rationality. For example, the “best responses” that the parties can choose when driving toward equilibrium in a Prisoners’ Dilemma situation may prevent the parties from attaining mutually advantageous compromises. Rationality may also lead to undesirable political and human consequences.
3. Too little rationality. A-rationality, emotions and passions, such as fear, honor, and dignity, or the prevalence of “redemptive politics”, may also make compromise solutions unattainable. The social construction of physical things as sacred may be why the parties in conflict are driven to give up present community life and identity for the sake of future redemption. This is tantamount to watching mutual national suicide. It is important, however, to understand rational and emotional processes as mutually constitutive.
4. The depth and strength of the lack of a commitment to a solution. Are we really stuck if the parties are not actually strategically posturing? Can a rational process be built out of emotional “stuff?”
5. The spoilers. This problem, also called the “school syndrome scenario,” is the ability of radicals to blow up each other’s schools as soon as the peace process resumes. Why, for example, isn’t self-restraint the solution? Think about it; Israelis know they are being provoked, and so the rational thing to do is not to react. Yet they react, “religiously.” Palestinians know it is within their ability to break the chain between suicide bombing and reprisals, and that doing so may lead to a viable Palestinian state, but they don’t. Why? What is the mechanism involved and can it be defeated? Is it about emotions that enter domestic politics? Does it have to do with the deep internal divisions on both sides? Is it about deontological injunctions rather than instrumental decisions?
Also even if there were an agreement between the main parties, other actors in the world can still be spoilers.

6. **Whether the process should be simultaneous or sequential in nature.** Which side should go first in making “sacred” concessions, the stronger or weaker side?

7. **Time, or whether the parties conceive historical processes and the future to be on their side.** Thus, for example, if Palestinians believe that Israel will eventually disappear, as all colonial enterprises have, then why would they bother to make concessions? Or, if Israelis believe that a clash of civilizations with the Muslim world is inevitable, again, why bother? Moreover, there is the question about short and medium-term solutions as opposed to long-term solutions. We may be stuck in time, “fighting” the last peace, while the problem may already have evolved in ways that we may neither realize nor understand.

8. **Lack of authoritative and credible leadership.**

9. **Whether the difficulties in identifying the nature of the problem stem from intellectual or moral failure.** Or, are they derived from lack of shared understandings of the conflict’s complexity, reciprocity norms, or from the inability not just to forget, but also to forgive? Moreover, if defining problems and solutions is power, are the sides caught in an endless struggle for power to frame problems and solutions in their way, which means never reaching the solution stage?

10. **Finally, a structural paradox: you are damned if you do (cooperate or exercise self-restraint), and damned if you don’t (cooperate and exercise self-restraint).** This paradox, really, is a combination of two International Relations’ paradoxes: the liberal paradox, according to which mutual advantages are trumped by fears of becoming a “sucker”, and the realist paradox, according to which lack of cooperation results from the self-fulfillment of prophecies.

### The Solutions

1. **Reflexive action, learning, and reframing.** We would like the conflicting parties to learn to think about politics in non-linear and interactive ways and we believe that they may mutually profit from reflexively abandoning instrumental best responses. We see a solution in reframing the problem as one of mutual loss. Fear of losing life and identity may lead actors to postpone redemption. Reframing may take an actual catastrophe, a major war perhaps, but social entrepreneurs have in the past been able to mobilize the masses’ despair to stop spoilers. There are recent examples in history, such as the end of the Cold War and of Apartheid in South Africa, which were characterized by reframing and learning without catastrophe. We should also first try to understand why the Oslo Peace process failed.

2. **Changing self in order to change the other, thus changing the structure of the situation.** This may require not just empathy, but also constructing the intersection points of the game and acquiring “secular faith in life after the conflict.” Another suggestion is developing a Mediterranean shared identity based on fair compromise between life and justice.

3. **Learning from historical precedents.** We may draw lessons from the French wars of religion, which fortification and separation brought to an end, a solution that probably will not apply to Jerusalem. The “Thirty Years War,” however, came to an end partly with changes in the rules of the political game, the creation of states, an international system, and norms governing state interaction.

4. **Defusing.** This means changing the parties’ expectations and dispositions by restructuring social reality, in this case, the Middle East rules of the game. Although the trigger of defusing may be a shared threat (perhaps Iran?), it can be obtained only through bold path-breaking, and dramatic initiatives, which may require concerted international action and leadership (mainly US leadership), and a sense of crisis and urgency. I mean, really, having something like a grand post-war settlement, but without the grand war. The coming to terms with the notion that a nuclear holocaust was likely helped defuse the Cold War. The notion that the present situation may be leading to total chaos and loss of communal identity (what Anthony Giddens called “ontological insecurity”), and perhaps also a clash between the West and the Muslim world, may become a lever for defusing the Arab-Israeli conflict.

5. **Bringing about reflexive change, learning, self-change, and defusing in practice,** in other words, moving ideas from the halls of higher learning to the halls of government. How do we translate the suggested solutions into practical political steps? How do we go about practically promoting reframing? What social mechanisms can practically help overcome what has been termed the “School Syndrome Scenario”? We thus need *theoretically based political pragmatics*, or praxis, which is conceptually driven toward rationalizing conflict resolution processes.
Politics at Noon: Focusing On Junior Faculty

One of the challenging aspects of working in Canada's largest Political Science department is that it can be somewhat difficult to get to know your newest colleagues - let alone learn about their current research. In an attempt to tackle this on-going dilemma, the department initiated a noontime series of research workshops this fall that highlighted the work of Junior Faculty in particular.


In this issue of Discourse's “Focus on Faculty” we highlight the current work of one of the Politics at Noon participants, Antoinette Handley.

The Macropolitics of HIV/AIDS

Antoinette Handley

If you consider the sheer scale and dimensions of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, it is clear that this is a critical policy issue, with vast implications. The statistics are numbing: HIV/AIDS has already killed more than 20 million people worldwide, around 40 million people worldwide are currently infected with HIV, and AIDS is now the leading cause of death in Africa and the fourth-leading cause of death worldwide.

And yet, when you review the pages of major political science journals, the epidemic has received surprisingly little sustained attention from political scientists. To the extent that the issue is considered, it is often as yet another add-on in long list of travails affecting the developing world. Outside of lurid predictions in the popular press, there has been little serious consideration of its potentially transformative potential. At one level, it appears that political science has not yet developed the vocabulary, the necessary set of analytic frameworks, to grapple with this crisis.

Yet the tools of political science have much to contribute. My new research suggests at least three ways of framing the problem that may help us to understand the pandemic and our responses to it a little better. I argue that we should look sideways (reversing the usual causal arrows), outwards (to the international political economy) and inwards (into the individual human body).

First off, it is striking that, to the limited extent that HIV/AIDS has been considered by political science, it has been considered as an outcome, as the dependent variable. (One example here is the argument that war and social dislocation have contributed to the spread of HIV). However it is important to think about the pandemic also as the driver of political and social change, the independent variable. With the benefit of hindsight we are now, for example, able to see the
massive social and economic dislocations that the Black Death engendered in mediaeval societies. It is entirely conceivable that similarly seismic shifts are occurring in AIDS-affected societies. Analytically then, there is value in thinking about HIV/AIDS, not just as a strictly bio-medical issue, but as a massive, long-term and multifaceted shock to afflicted societies, and we need to begin to track its impact on their politics and economies.

In my new research project, I plan to examine the impact of HIV/AIDS on two core political institutions, namely the state and business respectively. My reasons for looking at the state are self-evident and do not need much explanation. By contrast, the private sector is less often considered an important respondent - yet it may have both the means and the motivation to react: faced with the prospect of economic slowdown, of declining profits, and of challenges to its ability to procure labour and sustain a customer base, business has an urgent set of incentives that galvanize its response to the crisis. Together business and the state sit at the heart of the management of the political economy; and both have, at least in theory, the capacity to respond to that epidemic and, in turn, to be themselves transformed.

This brings me to a second perspective, namely the importance of thinking about the epidemic within an international political economy framework. Over the last forty years, developing countries have faced at least two major, multifaceted, long-term crises, both of which administered a fundamental series of shocks to the body politic: the first was the economic crisis of the late 1970s, the second the HIV/AIDS pandemic, which predated the 1990s but only really began to attract sustained policy attention in that decade.

From the early 1980s, the “Washington consensus” exemplified an internationally sanctioned set of policies that was aggressively marketed by powerful international institutions as the solution to the sub-continent’s economic crisis. Adoption of these prescriptions was made a condition for access to the financial resources of the IMF and World Bank. Crucially, the advent of the neo-liberal era challenged both public and private actors to revisit their respective roles in the economy; indeed the Washington consensus explicitly sought to revolutionise the relationship between state and market, government and business.

Now a second and even more urgent crisis is at hand: that posed by the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Like the developing world’s economic woes, this is a wide-ranging and long-wave crisis, rooted in a complex set of political, social and economic factors; it has dramatically affected the prospects of millions of people; and it demands a concerted response from the core institutions of the affected societies. Developing countries once again face a wide set of pressures to respond. The “Geneva consensus,” to use Evan Lieberman’s term, advocates a relatively coherent set of “best practice” guidelines emanating from the world’s health institutions (including the WHO, UNAIDS and Global Fund). Like the reaction to the economic crisis of the 1970s, the HIV/AIDS crisis too could revise the roles and responsibilities respectively of government and business.

Third and finally, I would argue that we should also direct our analytic gaze inwards, into the human body. The mutation of the virus within an individual body serves as a powerful metaphor for the progress of the epidemic through a society.

As with the virus in the body, the effects of the early stages of the epidemic on society are not readily apparent, and the first wave of HIV infection may go largely unnoticed. The society is alerted only some time later (5 – 8 years in much of Africa) once those who are infected begin to fall ill and die. This complicates the political ability to “diagnose” and “treat” the epidemic too.

Moreover, those who study how the HIV virus behaves inside a human body tell us that the way the virus mutates in each individual human body is unique to the specificities and vulnerabilities of that body. This adaptive characteristic of the virus is part of what makes it so difficult to develop a generic antidote. In a similar way but on a larger scale, the epidemic maps onto and exploits the susceptible contours and characteristics of the human societies that it enters – and this complicates the international policy response. In Southern Africa, for example, an important vector of transmission for the epidemic was the migrant labour system, created initially to meet the needs of South African mines for cheap black labour, and thus yoking South Africa with Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe. These migratory passages inadvertently provided a path for the virus to travel back with infected miners to their rural homesteads.

In a number of states, the epidemic also maps onto class cleavages: In South Africa with its scandalous levels of economic inequality, the epidemic disproportionately affects the poor, those whose immune systems are already compromised by disease and malnutrition. By contrast, in Zambia many of those infected in the early stages of the epidemic were drawn from the ranks of bureaucrats, from among those more well-off who enjoyed higher levels of mobility and could afford to pay for sex. As with the development of the virus inside a single human body then, the progression of the epidemic presents a response to particular vectors of transmission in each locale; AIDS manifests in a distinctive way depending on the specifics of each society.

The epidemic – like the virus - shifts its shape over time. This can make the study of the crisis frustrating and evanescent. It also makes it tremendously revealing: after all, the course of the epidemic tells us at least a much about the societies it travels through, as about the syndrome itself. In short, the pathology of the virus mirrors its epidemiology, and the epidemiology in turn speaks eloquently about the politics and functioning of these societies. Political science should not fail to pay attention to so revealing and ruthless a voice.
Getting a Handle on Antoinette Handley
Elinor Bray-Collins

“What is the difference between the left and the right?”

That is the first political question Antoinette Handley ever remembers asking. At roughly 6 years of age, Handley was soliciting an answer to her query from her father; a maize farmer from the KwaZulu Natal midlands in South Africa, where Handley also grew up on her parent’s farm.

“He wasn’t educated in politics, but he still managed to get it sort of right”, she recalls.

“He told me that the people on the right wanted things to stay the same, whereas the people on the left wanted them to change. In the context of South Africa, anyway, this wasn’t too far off”.

Handley had to hold on for another decade, until she started her university studies, before she could continue asking the questions of politics and power that captured her attention.

“I really felt like I had been waiting to get there”, she stresses. “There” was the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, where she took her first courses in politics, and completed her undergraduate degree in English and Political Science. Handley’s undergraduate years also marked her entry into political activism. In fact, she took an entire year out of her education to assume the presidency of the university’s student council.

This was an enormously political time in South Africa, and Handley witnessed, in both raw and nuanced ways, the crucial importance of politics in people’s lives. It is this awareness of the power of politics to shape the everyday lives of ordinary people – especially those in the developing world – that continues to be a driving force in her research and teaching.

In 1993, at the height of South Africa’s struggle towards democracy, Handley (somewhat reluctantly, she admits) left on a Rhodes scholarship for Oxford University, where she completed an MPhil in international relations. Gaining distance from South Africa helped Handley broaden her gaze beyond the politics and horizons of her home and, as she describes it, “take a step back and to consider similar questions, but more internationally and more comparatively”.

After completing her MPhil, Handley took a position as the Latin American Research Fellow at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) in Johannesburg, and thus began yet another riveting chapter in her engagement with all things political.

“It was tremendously exciting to be there” she says. “This was the time when diplomatic relations were being re-established with South Africa, after decades of international isolation, which meant an incredible array of speakers and political figures were coming through. We were all there, trying to figure out exactly what South African foreign policy was going to look like.”

At about this time, Handley became intrigued by the politics of trade and economic policy in particular. “I was aware that, at least in terms of the structure of its economy, South Africa resembled countries in Latin America more closely than it did other African countries – it looked more like a Brazil than it did a Mozambique”.

Handley further pursued her research interests in the position of Director of Studies at the Institute in 1996, and oversaw research on issues of trade, security, foreign policy, etc. It became clear to her, however, that if she wanted to delve more deeply into thinking about politics, the NGO world may not be the place to do it. “It was a great job and an extremely fast-paced environment” Handley reflects, “But there was less space for careful and considered thinking.”

So, in 1998, Handley left South Africa once again to pursue studies; this time as a Fulbright scholar at Princeton University. “At Princeton I continued to focus on international issues, but started to think more specifically about Africa as a region, which was not something I had the chance to really do yet”. Her dissertation, completed in 2003, is entitled “Business and Economic Policy Making: A study of Four African Countries.

It was also in 2003 that Handley joined the University of Toronto’s Political Science department. She is currently in the final stages of completing a book, based on her dissertation research, which looks at the contribution of indigenous business communities to economic policymaking in four African countries. Her new research, presented at the Politics at Noon series this term, deals with the Macropolitics of HIV/AIDS in Africa.

So after all of her experiences in various corners of the world, how does Antoinette Handley like living in Toronto? “I miss South Africa horribly” she confesses, “but I love Toronto, and I love its neighborhoods”. She pauses for a moment and then adds: “I know it isn’t perfect, but for all its warts, it makes my South African heart glad to live in a city where diversity works”.

MOVING?
Send us your new address!
A History for All! Public holidays, Memory and Nation-Building in the New South Africa

Melissa Levin

In what ways has the South African state attempted to provide a narrative for the nation? More specifically, how have public holidays been used to symbolically forge, delimit and authorize South Africa’s memory and its past?

Imagining the nation in post-apartheid South Africa relies on the reinterpretation of the past and elaborating new and unified meanings to public memories. This composition of a post-colonial national identity began in the decades prior to freedom, where the dominant liberation formation, the African National Congress (ANC), together with its allies, proclaimed that “South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white”. This 1955 declaration was echoed in the election slogan that swept the organization to victory in 1994 that the ANC sought to create “a better life for all”. The “for all” was a purposeful articulation of the idea that freedom will benefit both black and white people. With grand narrative agility, South Africa became “one nation, many cultures” or the internationally projected “rainbow nation”.

Freedom Day marks the birth of the new South Africa; the days commemorated as markers of the struggle against apartheid become the inheritors of this new worldview and are thus thoroughly transformed by it. In this inverted schema, the idea of victors and the vanquished is devoid of human culpability. Rather, the simplified past (with generalized people of the past, but not us) and a more complicated present (with the generalized us) are personified as winners and losers. One way in which this idea is given voice is through the incorporation of new public holidays for a new nation. These public holidays serve as one among many loci for the production of political memory, memory which is central to the construction of identities and hence of the nation. The choice of which days are memorialized and the content of those days are not arbitrary, but belong to a history of struggle and a negotiated settlement at a moment of triumph for global capitalism. This discursive approach to identity formation is as yet unsettled. In the uneasy compromise that registered South Africa’s transition, we have yet to witness the intersection between narrative aspirations towards unity and the transformation of material conditions of inequality.

At the level of official, authorized memory, public holidays act to assert the (brand new) tradition of South Africa as a nation of reconcilers, as a nation that came through slaughter and reached the other side holding hands. The slate is wiped clean. At each public commemoration, the present is cleansed, and the necessary State performances of this historical cleansing ritual point to the very constructedness of memory and the precariousness of the nation-building project aimed at reconciliation and unity. Neither is a stable category.

There are twelve public holidays in South Africa that were instituted after 1994. Apart from the Christian ones, seven of these are political. The oldest one is Day of Reconciliation, which captures the spirit of all the political days and demonstrates most acutely the historical trajectory traversed in the refashioning of a united nation. Prior to freedom, Reconciliation Day was commemorated separately by the apartheid state and black South Africans. On that day, in 1838, the voortrekker, Piet Retief and his coterie of trekkers, killed by Dingaan, the then Zulu King, were avenged. The voortrekkers promised G-d that should He assist them in massacring Zulus, they would build a church. Thousands of Zulus were indeed slaughtered in what became known as The Battle of Blood River and was institutionalized as the Day of the Vow. For the apartheid state, the slaying of Retief was evidence of the sly and untrustworthy character of the Native, and the victory of the voortrekkers a sign that they were chosen by G-d. For liberation formations and Zulu cultural nationalists, this was evidence of 1) the brave rejection of the pillaging of land from its black inhabitants and 2) the violent character of the colonizing impulse. UmKhonto we Sizwe (MK), the underground liberation army of the ANC, was launched on that day.

In the new country, these disparate interpretations of the same historical event are reconciled under the banner of unity. No longer do we steal land or kill each other. At this time, we share the land, symbolically at least, if not materially. Our differences are resolved through dialogue and not through the barrel of a gun. On one level this can be read as an obliteration of conflict and contradiction. On another level, however, this new rendering of the story can be read as a transformation of the meaning of apartheid and recoding its devastating symbols with new frames of reference. To this day though, there are still groups of right-wing Afrikaners who spend the 16th of December at the Voortrekker Monument to recall their vow with G-d. But they are just regarded as the spoilers. They are few. For most of us, the Day of Reconciliation signals the start of a long December break; it is a festive day, and a day on which, ironically, many “love-birds” choose to get married.

On one level there is something enormously radical in disrupting the norms and values of apartheid and reorienting a history beyond its confines. However, it must be remembered that although we were all wounded, as Desmond Tutu has claimed, we were wounded in different ways. Surely these differences are key when we imagine and build this

continued on next page
Peacebuilding: Between Security & Development in Iraq, Lebanon, Somalia and Sudan

Elisabeth King & Bob Matthews

In analyzing efforts to move away from conflict towards building a sustainable peace, the relationship between security and development is paramount. In opening a recent workshop exploring Iraq, Lebanon, Somalia and Sudan – some of the world’s most challenging (post)-conflict environments – co-organisers Professor Emeritus Bob Matthews, Professor Richard Sandbrook, and PhD Candidate Elisabeth King noted that while no security is sustainable without development, development cannot take place without security. All too often, however, post-conflict initiatives resemble a one-legged stool, precariously balanced on the leg of security, unable to remain standing upright.

The February 6th workshop, entitled Peacebuilding: Between Security & Development, generously sponsored by the Canadian Association for the Study of International Development (CASID), the Munk Centre, the Centre for International Studies (CIS), and the Department of Political Science, centred around speakers’ recent field experiences in Lebanon, Sudan, Iraq and Somalia. Each speaker, paired with a graduate student with expertise in the region, explored the security-development nexus that is central to these regions. They were joined by over 70 participants from the department and the wider community.

Paul Kingston, Associate Professor of Political Science and Development Studies at the University of Toronto at Scarborourgh, described how the progress that Lebanon had made in reestablishing security and promoting development since the signing of the Taif Accord in 1990 suffered serious setbacks during the recent clash with Israel. Kingston argued that although Lebanon has not yet achieved a security-development balance, prospects for building a durable peace in that country are very much dependent on the constellation of forces in the entire Middle East and at the global level.

Taisier Ali (PhD University of Toronto 1982), former Professor of Political Economy at the University of Khartoum and now Director of the newly-established Peacebuilding Centre for the Horn of Africa in Asmara, provided a very bleak assessment of the Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the north and south in January 2005. The failure and unwillingness of the central government to bring an end to the violence in Darfur and to implement the security provisions of the CPA has meant that there is little security in the country and no prospect for development except in the golden triangle around the confluence of the two Niles.

David Cameron, Chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto and Board Member of the Forum of Federations, argued that Iraq’s experience since 2003 provides support for the proposition that you cannot have development and democracy without basic security. Despite the phenom-inal amount of money the United States has poured into Iraq, there is widespread insecurity and no development. The failure of US forces “to hold the ring” while new institutions were built and a revised constitution drafted has resulted in conditions that can only be described as a civil war. In such circumstances it is not surprising that many Iraqis argue that they were better off with Saddam Hussein.

Finally, Ian Spears, Associate Professor of International Relations and Development at the University of Guelph, contrasted the law and order established recently in Somalia by the Islamic Courts with the violent rule of the warlords throughout the
The first theme concerned the nature of the state and state-society relations. In Lebanon, the state is structured along confessional lines, and is therefore weak and divided. The notion of a Lebanese citizenship is undermined. Although Lebanon actually has a vibrant civil society, these civil associations have few ways to link to or lobby the confessionally-based state and thus, their political influence remains limited. In Sudan, the problem is not one of a weak state but of a state that has been captured by a small Arab-Muslim minority. Conflicts have arisen not only in the South but in many regions of the North where the local populations have been marginalized and their needs largely ignored. In Somalia, the clash between a highly decentralized society organized around clans and sub-clans and the idea and reality of a central state have undermined efforts to form a provisionally governed government in Mogadishu. Finally, Iraq, fast becoming a country torn apart along communal lines, might have lessons to learn from the successes and failures of the Lebanese case.

The second theme influencing the four cases concerned the impact of the larger region on the local conflict. The common lesson is that civil wars are rarely contained within their national borders, and consequently, any resolution of these conflicts must be cast in a regional context. At the very least, regional actors must refrain from meddling in the internal conflicts of their neighbours.

A third theme is the conclusion that these, and for that matter most, conflicts cannot be settled through the barrel of a gun, but only through political negotiations. The solution to Lebanon’s present conflict cannot start by insisting on the disarmament of Hezbollah in the absence of a fair regional political agreement that includes addressing other pressing and on-going issues. Without such an agreement, attempts to resolve the entire region’s domestic crisis are bound to fail. Khartoum’s ongoing genocidal attacks on the African population of Darfur amount to the use of violence as the sole means for resolving that insurgency. Hopefully the Government of Sudan can be pressed into accepting a negotiated settlement, for only in that way can a lasting peace be established. The formation of a government of national unity that is perceived as being legitimate by the vast majority of Iraqis is a prerequisite for an end to the daily slaughter we witness in Baghdad.

Finally, there seemed to be a consensus among the four presenters that building a durable peace would require a stool that is multi- and not two-legged. A secure environment and a robust economy must be supplemented by the crafting of a new constitution, the fashioning of legitimate political institutions, efforts at justice, and a process of reconciliation.

Elisabeth King is a 4th year PhD student in International Relations and Comparative Politics.

Robert Matthews is Professor Emeritus in Political Science at the University of Toronto.

A Political Science undergrad challenges U of T to Butt Out – and it does.

Elinor Bray-Collins

On March 29th, thanks largely to the hard work of Political Science Undergrad Tyler Ward, the University of Toronto announced it will begin divestment of its $10.5 million in tobacco stocks. This makes the University of Toronto the first university in Canada to eliminate tobacco company investments on ethical grounds. This giant step in a healthier and more ethical direction comes as a result of a student-led campaign by E-BUTT (Education-Bringing Youth Tobacco Truths) - a tobacco control group run by students and based at the University of Toronto. Tyler, who lost a parent to lung cancer himself, is E-BUTT’s founder and president.

Since the E-BUTT campaign was launched, the unassuming Tyler Ward has become a magnet for media attention. He has made no less than 14 media appearances in the last four months, including interviews on the CBC, CTV, with The Toronto Star and The Globe and Mail, to name but a few. Tyler was also the recipient of the Smoke-Free Ontario Award in recognition of E-BUTT’s efforts to make Ontario Universities tobacco industry-free environments. The award was presented by Toronto’s Chief Medical Officer of Health, Dr. David McGeeown.

With this major victory under its belt in less than a year, E-BUTT is now working on expanding its activities to create a national coalition with branches at McGill University, University of Waterloo, Queen’s University and the University of British Columbia.

It is a wonder Tyler has still had the time to keep up his work for POL201Y.
Conflict Prevention in Global Politics:

A Brief Reflection on Before the Crisis Breaks: Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Preventive Diplomacy in the 21st Century, the Peace and Conflict Society’s Second Annual International Conference (February 2-4, 2007)

Mike Lawrence

Bringing together academics, practitioners and over 120 delegates from around the world, Before the Crisis Breaks explored the dynamics and dilemmas of contemporary conflict prevention and crisis management. To focus discussion, the conference began with the distinction between structural prevention, which targets root causes of conflict through primarily developmental imperatives, and operational prevention, which addresses an emerging escalatory process when the risks are proximate, widespread violence appears imminent, and the span of time for intervention is short. In such circumstances, states remain the most suitable agents of prevention for the array of sticks and carrots at their disposal. And yet, a central conference theme was the inability of an ‘international politics’ framework to cope with the realities of operational prevention.

The basic problem is this: in a world order outfitted with international institutions and norms, states remain the primary agent of operational prevention. But the effectiveness of preventive efforts is impeded by the reification of state borders in academic and policy debates alike, such that success requires thinking above and below the level of the state.

The first pitfall of conflict prevention is to assume that the violent conflicts of primary concern are confined to state borders. The category ‘civil conflict’ deceptively ignores the transnational dimensions of new wars and treats as ‘domestic’ crises better understood on a regional scale. A key tool for preventing a subsequent escalation is thus to cultivate regional partners around the epicenter of the conflict – a point underscored by the importance of Syria and Iran to a more effective Iraq strategy. A second impediment to effective prevention is to think in terms of an ‘external intervention’ into ‘internal conflicts’. The international order shapes the incentives of a local escalatory process, whether inadvertently through economic shocks and the tacit permissiveness of inaction, or deliberately through state diplomacy, including both carrots and sticks. Similarly, local actors can shape the international climate, such as when the Kosovo Liberation Army reputedly invited Serbian massacres in order to induce international intervention. International preventive efforts should be understood as the attempt to alter the incentives encountered by local elites – incentives that already implicate the prevailing international order, the current climate and individual relationships – in order to compel a buy-in to institutions that channel conflict into political forums. Carrots such as accession to international and regional institutions, and sticks such as military intervention, can alter the jockeying of elites for power within a country in conflict.

Thinking below the state level highlights the flexibility of international politics and the state interests that comprise it. While inadequate prevention is often deemed a failure of political will, this ‘failure’ is really a choice made by states because a proposed course of action will not work, will cost too much, or is not in their interests. There is no failure, only the choice to pursue different priorities. The process of translating the warning signs of conflict into decisive political action must thus be understood as political---as all the conference case studies demonstrated. Preventive actors are not pursuing peace altruistically, but rather to enhance their own interests. These interests can be engineered by assessing the costs of inaction, proposing realistic strategies for success, and convincing key constituencies that they ought to care. While an emerging crisis can easily spill over state boundaries, the interests that motivate an effective response are affected by politics which transcend the boundaries of the state, and in both cases borders can be misleading.

These dynamics of contemporary operational prevention are just one theme that emerged from conference sessions, and will hopefully serve as a starting point for subsequent research by the Peace and Conflict Society. For a more detailed treatment of conflict prevention and crisis management, please see the Conference Concepts Paper, available at: http://www.peaceandconflictsociety.ca/conf/.

Mike Lawrence is an Undergraduate student in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Toronto and one of the Organizers of Before the Crisis Breaks

Note:
1. This theme emerged primarily from the conference’s thematic plenary addresses, and the ideas presented here are drawn from the presentations of the speakers at those sessions.
ICMs and Political Science:
A Trip to Japan by Students in a Contemporary Issues in Peace and Conflict Course

Michael Stein
(based on material provided by Professor David Welch and his students who made the trip to Japan)

One of the new Arts and Science Faculty program initiatives that has greatly benefited the University of Toronto’s Political Science Department is the Internationalized Course Module (ICM). This is a program designed to narrow the gap between book/classroom learning and direct observation and experience with the subject matter of undergraduate courses. In the case of the Contemporary Issues in Peace and Conflict course (JUP460Y), taught by Professor David Welch, this involved providing students with an opportunity to visit the Yasukuni Military Shrine and National Defense Academy in Tokyo, Japan, and witness firsthand in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki war memorials what the devastating Japanese experience with two atomic bomb attacks on civilian populations was like at the end of World War II.

The students who made the week-long trip to Japan between Saturday, February 17th and Sunday, February 25th, during study break, were extremely positive about this learning experience. Among the reactions that are worthy of note are those of Hanae Baruchel, Max Kelly and Hugh Smiley.

For example, Baruchel commented:
“I must admit that before leaving Toronto I thought carefully about the educational value of this trip…I quickly realized, upon arriving in Japan, that I had been mistaken to expect this educational value...to be of secondary importance. Every city, every encounter, was more enriching and educational (even in the traditional sense) than I could ever have expected."

In particular she criticized the Yasukuni Shrine for continuing to justify what Japan’s military did in World War II as being provoked by others and as a further manifestation of that country’s inability to face its imperialism and war crimes. On the other hand she found that most senior students at Tokyo’s National Defense Academy, contrary to her expectation, were strongly opposed to any revision of the Japanese constitution that permitted its military forces to have offensive capabilities.

Max Kelly echoed much of this sentiment. He noted:
“The strange way historical narratives were stripped of any sense of agency on the part of the individuals, institutions or nations involved...as if there were no choices, and certainly no moral choices involved, but rather a fatal sequence of episodes that lay beyond the capacity of mere humans to alter.”

However, his observations of the Tokyo National Defense Academy were somewhat different from those of Baruchel. He argued that “although the cadets expressed broad support for altering the constitution to allow for a stronger role for the military, their views on exactly what that role should be on their nation’s war record, and more generally on its role on the world stage, were quite varied.”

Hugh Smiley registered some evocative and empathetic personal reactions to the Hiroshima and Nagasaki part of the Japanese trip.
“To have stood at or very near ground zero at these momentous geopolitical sites has provided me with a significant compass point which helps orient my relationship with the earth and human history. As the events which have immortalized the names of these two cities around the planet derive from the psychology of politics as well as war, this pilgrimage of peace can serve as an incubator of sorts, if not for answers about what makes people tick, then at least for deeper and more insistent questions regarding the relative values of rational communication versus ticking bombs.”

Based on these highly emotive and insightful comments by representative students who made the trip in order to narrow the gap between formal education and direct experience, it seems clear that the new ICM program has convincingly achieved its intended objective.
Professor Jean Smith Publishes Biography of Franklin Delano Roosevelt

Professor Emeritus Jean Edward Smith informs us that he has recently published another of a long list of highly acclaimed political biographies of famous Americans. This biography, entitled \textit{FDR}, concerns the life and achievements of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the esteemed former American President and international political icon. The book has been published by Random House in a first printing of 75,000 copies, which is unusually large for a scholarly biography. The pre-publication reviews have also been very favourable. We extend our congratulations to Jean for another outstanding contribution to the academic literature in this field.

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A New Graduate Scholarship in International Relations at the U of T

The Political Science Department of the University of Toronto is pleased to announce the establishment by one of its former distinguished faculty members, Franklin W. Peers, of the Vincent Tovell Graduate Scholarship in International Relations. This scholarship will be awarded to graduate student(s) in International Relations on the basis of their previous achievement in one of the related subject areas of this field, including political science, history, economics and sociology. Formal applications are not required. The scholarship will be first awarded in 2008, and subsequently on an annual basis. The value of the Scholarship will be determined in accordance with its annual income. The scholarship was donated by Professor Peers in honour of Vincent Tovell, a graduate of the University of Toronto, an Officer of the Order of Canada, and a Senior Fellow of Massey College, who had a lifelong interest in international affairs and conflict resolution among peoples.

U of T Political Science Graduate Wins an Ontario Rhodes Scholarship for 2007

The Political Science Department is pleased to announce that one of its former undergraduate students, Kofi Hope, has won one of two Ontario Rhodes Scholarships for 2007. Hope graduated in June 2006 with an Honours BA degree in Political Science and a minor in Religion and African Studies. He has also been a leader both locally and nationally on the issue of violence in the African-Canadian community. At Oxford he will pursue a master’s degree in Political Philosophy.